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CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MUST ACCORD
CONCLUSIVE DEFERENCE TO ANOTHER
CIRCUIT'S DETERMINATION OF THE LAW OF
A STATE WITHIN THE OTHER CIRCUIT:
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.
In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. ,1 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, exercising diversity jurisdiction, 2 held that it must give conclu-
sive deference to the Sixth Circuit's3 determination of an unsettled ques-
tion of Tennessee law.4 The Second Circuit's decision to forego an
independent determination of Tennessee law is significant for several
reasons. First, the court failed to ascertain how the New York Court of
Appeals-the highest court in the forum state-would have weighed the
Sixth Circuit's determination of Tennessee law.5 Second, the decision
may spawn federal/state forum shopping. 6 Finally, the court failed to
set forth adequate justifications for its decision.7
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Directive to Apply State Law
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 8 the Supreme Court held that fed-
eral courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the law of the
forum state, whether that law "is declared by its Legislature in a statute
1 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
3 Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980).
4 The underlying issue in the case was the descendibility of rights of publicity. In deter-
mining whether a right of publicity survives death, courts and commentators generally rely
on analogies. They have analogized the right of publicity to privacy, defamation, property,
and copyright law. See generally Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of
the Right of Publicity.- Is There Commercial Life After Death, 89 YALE LJ. 1125 (1980); Felcher &
Rubin, ,vn'ac,, Publicily, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ. 1577 (1979);
Nimmer, The Right of Publiciy, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954); Shipley, Publiciy
Never Dies Itjust Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
673 (1981); Note, The Right of Publicity-Prolection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 527 (1976); Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 29 HAS-
TINGS LJ. 757 (1978); Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity. Dracula's Progeny and Privag fs
Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1103 (1975).
5 See Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1961) (per curiam). See also
notes 26-31 and accompanying text infia.
6 See notes 62-65 and accompanying text infra.
7 See notes 70-80 and accompanying text infra.
8 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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or by its highest court in a decision." 9 Erie sought to prevent forum
shopping1 ° by promoting intrastate uniformity in the interpretation of
state law;II under Enk', state and federal courts sitting in the same state
would apply the same interpretation of state law.12
Three years after Erie, the Supreme Court held that federal courts
adjudicating state-created rights are bound by the forum state's conflict
of laws rules.' 3 "Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship
would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate
state and federal courts sitting side by side."' 14 Conflict among the fed-
eral circuit courts, however, was inevitable and acceptable.' 5
9 Id. at 78. Prior to Erie, the Rules of Decision Act of 1789, Federal Judiciary Act, ch.
20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)), directed federal courts
to apply the laws of the several states in trials at common law. In Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), the Supreme Court defined "laws," as used in the statute, to mean state stat-
utes and local usages; its definition explicitly excluded the state's general common law. Id. at
18. The decision permitted federal courts sitting in diversity to apply general rules of law and
thereby encouraged the existence of two interpretations of the law within one state. Because
rights varied according to where litigants instituted a lawsuit, and noncitizens could choose
whether to go to state or federal court, Swiff permitted discrimination by noncitizens against
citizens of a particular state. Equal protection under the law was impossible. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938). Swi/) thus enabled plaintiffs in diversity actions to
examine state and federal precedents on the relevant substantive law and then select that
forum offering the more favorable result. For example, in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), Brown & Yellow, a
Kentucky corporation, sought to enjoin another Kentucky corporation from interfering with
an exclusive contract to solicit passengers. Because the contract was void under Kentucky
law, but not under federal law, Brown & Yellow reincorporated in Tennessee. In a federal
diversity action, Brown & Yellow successfully secured an injunction prohibiting the other
Kentucky corporation from interfering with its contract.
10 304 U.S. at 74-75.
11 Id. at75.
12 The Supreme Court apparently based its decision in Erie on constitutional grounds.
Justice Brandeis wrote: "[W]e should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely ap-
plied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now
been made clear and compels us to do so." Id. at 77-78 (footnote omitted). See general' C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 258-62 (3d ed. 1976). Instead of
relying on a statutory construction argument, Justice Brandeis couched the opinion in consti-
tutional terms. The fault lay not with Congress, but with the courts for invading "rights
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States." 304 U.S. at 80.
Although the opinion does not specify which constitutional provision the Swu#? doctrine vio-
lated, presumably the violation was the federal courts' attempt to declare substantive rules of
state common law and to dictate the manner in which courts should declare state law. See
Friendly, In Praire of Erie-A nd of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 384-98
(1964); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541 (1958).
13 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The Court stated: "The
conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those
prevailing in Delaware's state courts." Id. at 496. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this hold-
ing in Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam).
14 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
15 Whatever lack of uniformity [compelling federal courts to apply the conflict
of laws rule of the forum state] may produce between federal courts in differ-
ent states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state. . . the
right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for
the federal courts to thwart such local policies. ...
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Subsequently, the Court formulated the "outcome determinative"
test, under which federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction would
apply state law in order to ensure that the outcomes of similar cases
instituted in state and federal courts would be "substantially the
same." 16 The Supreme Court has since recognized that federal courts
cannot apply the outcome determinative test without reference to Eie's
twin goals: fostering intrastate uniformity in the administration of law
and discouraging forum shopping.1 7 When countervailing federal con-
siderations are present, federal courts may safely disregard the outcome
determinative test.18
B. Ascertaining State Law
Although Erie and its progeny direct federal courts exercising diver-
sity jurisdiction to apply state law, problems arise when state statutory
and decisional law offer no guidance on the question presented. Federal
courts called upon to determine state law must then use "all the avail-
able data" 19-primarily internal indications of state law such as the con-
Id.
16 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (state statute of limitations,
although often considered a "procedural" bar, must be applied by federal courts because "the
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same. . . as it would
be if tried in a State court").
Guaranty Trust's directive to apply state law, however, was not absolute. In Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958), the Court ruled that federal courts
must balance countervailing federal policies against the outcome determinative test. After
comparing the federal policy favoring jury resolutions of disputed fact questions with the
interest in intrastate uniformity, the Court concluded that "the federal court should not fol-
low the state rule." Id. at 538.
17 In Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Court held that federal courts sitting in
diversity must apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If a federal rule is applicable, and
the question is a procedural one, federal courts need not consult state law. If no federal rule is
applicable, however, federal courts must follow Erie. The Court clarified Erie and qualified
Guaranty Trust, statihg: "The 'outcome-determination' test therefore cannot be read without
reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance
of inequitable administration of the laws." Id. at 468 (footnote omitted).
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), the Court held that in diversity
cases state law defines when a lawsuit is commenced for the purpose of tolling statutes of
limitations, despite rule three of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Walker prevented the
federal/state forum shopping that application of rule three would promote in such situations,
thus furthering Erie's goals. See Note, Commencement Rules and Tolling Statutes of Limitations in
Federal Court: Walker v. Arnco Steel Corp., 66 CORNELL L. REv. 842 (1981).
18 In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), the Supreme
Court stated: "[W]ere 'outcome' the only consideration, a strong case might appear for say-
ing that the federal court should follow the state practice. But there are affirmative counter-
vailing considerations at work here." Id. at 537. The Court proceeded to find a "strong
federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal
courts," id. at 538, that outweighed application of the outcome determinative test announced
in Guaranty Trust. See C. WRIGHT, sura note 12, at 257; Smith, Blue Ridge and Bond. A Byrd's
Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TuL L. REv. 443 (1962).
19 West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). In West, the Court
stated:
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sidered judgment of an intermediate state appellate court 20 and
"considered dictum" of the state's highest court. 21 When no state prece-
dents exist, federal judges may predict how state judges would decide
the question, 22 or they may exercise their independent judgment.23
These two approaches converge as the amount of state guidance dimin-
ishes. Courts of appeals and the Supreme Court give special weight to
the decisions of federal court judges familiar with local law.24 Decisions
State law is to be applied in the federal as well as the state courts and it is the
duty of the former in every case to ascertain from all the available data what
the state law is and apply it rather than to prescribe a different rule, however
superior it may appear from the viewpoint of "general law" and however
much the state rule may have departed from prior decisions of the federal
courts.
Id. Federal courts have relied on common law principles, analogous decisions, restatements of
the law, law review articles, decisions of other states, and decisions of other federal courts to
assist them in determining state law. See IA J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.309[2], at 3122, 3124 (2d ed. 1981). Federal courts have also looked to considered dicta,
policies of construction, and legislative behavior. See Harnett & Thornton, Precedent in the
Eerie-Tompkins Manner: A Decade in Restrospect, 24 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 770, 782-90 (1949).
20 In West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., the Sixth Circuit disregarded an intermediate
state court decision, and the Supreme Court reversed. 311 U.S. 223 (1940). The Court held
that the considered judgment of an intermediate state appellate court is "state law," which
federal courts must apply. See also Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940). But
see Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) ("[U]nder some conditions,
federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling.").
21 Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 295 (1961) (per curiam); Harnett &
Thornton, spra note 19, at 784-86.
22 In Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge Frank
identified the predictive approach: "This case is in that zone in which federal courts must do
their best to guess what the highest state court will do." See Note, The Ascertainment of(State
Law in a Federal Diversiy Case, 40 IND. LJ. 541, 550 (1964) (arguing that Court's holding in
Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293 (1961) (per curiam), endorses the predictive
approach).
23 In New Eng. Mut. Life v. Mitchell, 118 F.2d 414, 420 (4th Cir. 1941), Judge Parker
articulated the proper approach for federal courts exercising independent judgment in deter-
mining state law:
The respectful attitude towards the local court, where there has been no deci-
sion on the precise question before us, is to consider that question in the light
of the common law of the state, with a view of reaching the decision which
reason dictates, and with the faith that the local court will reach the same
decision when the question comes before it.
See generally Harnett & Thornton, supra note 19, at 780.
Certification and abstention are two other options available to a federal court presented
with an unsettled question of state law. Although endorsed by the Supreme Court in Leh-
man Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), certification is a statutory remedy that is available
in only a limited number of states. Abstention is also oflimited utility. In Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), the Supreme Court held that a federal court cannot
decline to hear a case simply because it is difficult to ascertain how the state courts will
subsequently interpret state law. Thus, neither certification nor abstention greatly assists fed-
eral courts attempting to adjudicate an unsettled question of state law.
24 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956); accord, Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 345-46 (1976); United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1960);
Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944); MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co.,
315 U.S. 280 (1942).
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in other circuits generally persuade but do not bind circuit courts ruling
on ambiguous state law or questions of first impression in a state.25
C. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines
The policies behind Erie and its progeny and the difficulties inher-
ent in ascertaining state law absent clear state guidance converged in
Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines.26 In Nolan, the Second Circuit, exercising
diversity jurisdiction, properly had applied the conflict of laws rule of
the forum state, New York.27 New York's conflict of laws rule required
the application of California law.2 8 California law, however, was un-
clear.29 The Supreme Court directed the Second Circuit to determine
what relative wNeights the New York Court of Appeals, as the authorita-
tive source for ascertaining California law, would accord conflicting
California decisions. 30 Thus, Nolan requires a federal court sitting in
diversity to apply the forum state's interpretation of applicable law,
rather than the federal court's own interpretation of that law.31
25 Se, e.g., Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440
F.2d 36 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971). When deciding federal questions, courts
of appeals generally look to the decisions of other circuit courts as persuasive, but not disposi-
tive authority. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 517 F.2d 734, 741
(2d Cir. 1975) (court not bound by decision or rationale of another circuit); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Stevens, 445 F.2d 845, 846 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Mitchell, 432 F.2d 354, 356 (Ist
Cir.), cert denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1970). The Eighth Circuit will follow the decision of another
court of appeals "unless satisfied that it is erroneous." Spicknall's Estate v. Commissioner, 285
F.2d 561, 567 (8th Cir. 1961). The Fifth Circuit has determined only that Fifth Circuit deci-
sions and decisions of the United States Supreme Court bind it. United States v. Northside
Realty Assocs., Inc., 518 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1975). The Fifth Circuit treats a statement of
law by a court of appeals that the Supreme Court expressly approves as binding on other
courts of appeals. Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 858 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
981 (1965).
26 365 U.S. 293 (1961) (per curiam).
27 Id. at 294. See also note 13 and accompanying text sup ra.
28 365 U.S. at 294.
29 In two separate wrongful death actions, intermediate California courts had held that
where the claim of one beneficiary is time-barred, the claims of all beneficiaries are time-
barred. See Haro v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 594, 62 P.2d 441 (Dist. Ct. App.
1936); Sears v. Majors, 104 Cal. App. 60, 285 P. 321 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930). In a considered
dictum handed down immediately before argument in the federal court of appeals, however,
the California Supreme Court indicated that if one claimant is not time-barred, other claim-
ants in the same action are not time-barred. Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 208-09, 347
P.2d 12, 22 (1959).
30 365 U.S. at 295-96. The Court stated:
[I]nasmuch as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is charged with
mandatory appellate review in the present case, that court should decide
what relative weights, as authoritative sources for ascertaining California law,
the New York Court of Appeals would accord to the Sears-Haro line (direct
holdings of District Courts of Appeal between 1930 and 1938) and to Leeper (a
considered, relevant dictum of general scope by the California Supreme Court
in 1959).
Id.
31 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 266. For a discussion of which state court the federal
court represents, see Note, szupra note 22, at 551-53.
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II
FACTORS ETc, INC. V. PRO ARTS, INC.
Elvis Presley organized and incorporated Boxcar Enterprises under
Tennessee law and assigned to it the exclusive right to market commer-
cially his name and likeness.3 2 Two days after Presley's death, Boxcar
granted an exclusive license to Factors Etc., Inc. to market Presley's
name and likeness. 33 To safeguard its acquired interest, Factors sought
a preliminary injunction against alleged infringements by Pro Arts, Inc.
in the Southern District of New York.34 The district court, recognizing
a descendible "right of publicity, ' 35 granted the injunction, and the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed (Factors1).36
Shortly after Factors initiated Factors I, the Memphis Development
Foundation brought a declaratory judgment action in the Western Dis-
trict of Tennessee, Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc.,
seeking to prevent Factors from interfering with its efforts to advertise
and promote replicas of Presley.3 7 Factors counterclaimed for a prelimi-
nary injunction that would restrain distribution of the replicas. 38 The
district court, determining that a performer's right of publicity is de-
scendible,39 issued a preliminary injunction against the Foundation, 40
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.41 Factors later obtained a permanent
injunction in the district court.42 On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit
reversed.43 The Sixth Circuit noted that neither the Tennessee courts
nor the Tennessee legislature had determined the descendibility of the
right of publicity.44 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that it could
not assess the predisposition of the Tennessee courts on the issue.45 Con-
sequently, the court undertook an independent review of the question46
32 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 279 (2d Cir. 1981).
33 Id.
34 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aJ'd, 579 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
35 Id. at 290. A more complete analysis of these issues appears in a companion case,
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
36 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979).
37 Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn.
1977), afd, 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978).
38 Id. at 1325.
39 Id. at 1330.
40 Id. at 1331.
41 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978).
42 See Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960 (6th Cir.) (dis-
trict court determination made in unpublished court order), cer denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
43 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
44 Id. at 958.
45 Id. ("Tennessee courts have not addressed this issue directly or indirectly, and we
have no way to assess their predisposition.").
46 The court stated: "[W]e are left to review the question in the light of practical and
policy considerations, the treatment of other similar rights in our legal system, the relative
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and concluded that the right of publicity is not descendible under Ten-
nessee law.4 7
After the Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Development, Factors
moved for summary judgment in the New York litigation. The district
court, reaffirming its earlier determination that under Tennessee law the
right of publicity is descendible,48 permanently enjoined Pro Arts from
marketing Presley's name and likeness. 49 On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed (Factors I1), concluding that it would accord "conclusive defer-
ence" to the Sixth Circuit's determination of Tennessee law.50 In effect,
the Second Circuit elevated the Sixth Circuit's prediction of Tennessee
law to the .tatus of a rebuttable presumption; absent a clear basis in
Tennessee law for concluding that Tennessee courts would determine
that the Sixth Circuit's prediction was erroneous, the Sixth Circuit's rul-
ing would be accepted as controlling authority.51
weight of the conflicting interests of the parties, and certain moral presuppositions concerning
death, privacy, inheritability and economic opportunity." Id.
47 Id. The Sixth Circuit cited W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed.
1971) and J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) in support of its decision. 616 F.2d at
958-59. In addition, the court balanced the interests involved, measured the administrative
problems created, and concluded that to hold the right of publicity descendible is "contrary
to our legal tradition and somehow. . . contrary to the moral presuppositions of our cul-
ture." Id. at 959. The court addressed neither the Second Circuit's concerns in Factors I nor
the district court's reasoning in the decision below. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit did not
follow the approach advocated by most commentators, see note 4 supra, and neglected to
mention an analogous decision, Robinson v. Robinson, 9 Tenn. App. 103 (1929), in which a
Tennessee court implicitly recognized a descendible property right in a trade name. To con-
form with the Supreme Court's directive in ascertaining state law, a federal court must con-
sider "all the available data." West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1941); see
note 19 and accompanying text supra; Six Cos. of Cal. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S.
180 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940). West, however, does not
require a federal court actually to adopt the position advocated by commentators, analogous
decisions, and decisions of other circuits.
48 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rezid, 652 F.2d
278 (2d Cir. 1981).
49 Id. at 1104.
50 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 279 (2d Cir. 1981). Judge Newman,
writing for the majority, formulated the issue as "whether, and under what circumstances, a
ruling by a court of appeals, interpreting the common law of a state within its circuit, should
be regarded as authoritative by the other federal courts of the nation." Id. at 282. Judge
Mansfield, dissenting, more accurately formulated the issue as
whether a federal court of appeals, called upon to anticipate what general
common law rule with respect to a legal question might be appropriate for a
state having no law whatsoever on the subject, must adhere to the diversity
decision of a sister federal court of appeals within whose boundaries the state
is located.
Id. at 284.
51 Id. at 283. Thiee independent events could rebut the presumption:
A federal court in another circuit would be obliged to disregard a state law
holding by the pertinent court of appeals if persuaded that the holding had
been superseded by a later pronouncement from state legislative or judicial
sources. .. or that prior state court decisions had been inadvertently over-
looked by the pertinent court of appeals . . . . [or] the pertinent court of
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Judge Newman, writing for the majority, offered two justifications
for the court's decision to defer to the Sixth Circuit's prediction of Ten-
nessee law: a commitment to the orderly development of state law5 2 and
the desire to promote uniformity of state laws.53 In a vigorous dissent,
Judge Mansfield argued that the Sixth Circuit heard too few diversity
cases to have any "special knowledge or expertise in Tennessee law" 54
and that persuasive sources outside Tennessee law indicated that the
Sixth Circuit's prediction of the probable course of Tennessee law was
wrong.55 Further, the dissent maintained that a decision conflicting
with the Sixth Circuit's decision, although promoting uncertainty,
would induce legislative action faster than would a consistent decision5 6
and would promote the development of "lasting rules of common
law."'57 Judge Mansfield concluded therefore that the Second Circuit
should have made an independent determination of the probable course
of Tennessee law.58
appeals has disregarded clear signals emanating from the state's highest court
pointing toward a different rule.
Id. (footnote omitted).
In determining the authoritativeness of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Menphir Develop-
ment, the Second Circuit in Factors H was concerned primarily with the geographical circum-
scription of Tennessee within the Sixth Circuit. The court noted:
[Tihe author of Memphis Development is a distinguished member of the Tennes-
see bar, whose sense of what may be expected of the Tennessee Supreme
Court surely surpasses our own. But since Judge Merritt's opinion so emphat-
ically disclaims any basis for predicting how Tennessee will resolve the issue
on the merits, we prefer to determine the authoritativeness of Mmphis Develop-
ment with regard to the territorial scope of the Sixth Circuit, rather than the
heritage of the opinion's author.
Id. at 283 n.7.
52 Id. at 282.
53 Id. The court recognized that other states and other federal courts seeking to apply
the forum's conflict of laws rules could reach different predictions of Tennessee law. Nonethe-
less, the court thought that state courts would follow the Sixth Circuit's finding to promote
uniformity and argued that even if other courts did not share the Second Circuit's interest in
uniformity, short-lived uniformity would be preferable to immediate conflict. Id. at 282-83
n.6.
54 Id. at 285 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield noted that only 11.6% of the
appeals filed in the Sixth Circuit were diversity suits. Because these diversity suits came from
each of the seven states within the Circuit, Judge Mansfield concluded that the Sixth Circuit
could enjoy no special familiarity with Tennessee law.
55 Id. at 284 nn.1-2.
56 Id. at 286.
57 Id.
58 In the unusual situation here, where an initial court of appeals diversity
declaration is in no way derived from the law or practice of the state and
interprets no existing state law, we should feel free to reach a different result if
sound reasons recommend it, regardless of the unpersuasive views of the sister
circuit from which the initial declaration emanated.
Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 67:415
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III
THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S MISAPPLICATION OF Erie
The Second Circuit's justifications for its decision in Factors II do
not withstand analysis.5 9 Furthermore, the court overlooked a crucial
element of the Erie doctrine: how the New York Court of Appeals, the
highest court of the forum state, would have ascertained Tennessee law
59 See notes 66-76 and accompanying text infia. Interestingly, neither party argued for
the application of a conclusive deference rule. The parties asked the court to determine
whether Pro Arts could defensively assert the Sixth Circuit's decision to collaterally estop
Factors's suit. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 16, Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 6, Fac-
tors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981). The majority, however, did not
address the issue preclusion question in its disposition of the case. Id. at 280 n.3, 283 n.8. The
dissent summarily dismissed the issue. Id. at 288-89.
A party no longer need establish mutuality to assert issue preclusion. Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 326-28 (1971); Schwartz v.
Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969); Bernhard v. Bank of
America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); see Currie, Mutualip of CollateralEstoppel: Limitr
ofthe Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957). See also ParkIane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322 (1979) (offensive use of issue preclusion permissible despite lack of mutuality).
In order to apply issue preclusion, the issue in question must be identical to the issue
previously litigated. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88, Comment a (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1978). In addition, the issue must have been fully and fairly litigated, actually
decided, and necessary to the outcome of the previous decision. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 563-73 (2d ed. 1977).
In Memphir Development, the Sixth Circuit actually decided the issue of whether the right
of publicity is descendible, and that determination was essential to the outcome of the case.
Nevertheless, three obstacles to invocation of issue preclusion remained. First, Pro Arts at-
tempted to preclude relitigation of an issue of law in Factors II. Professors James and Hazard
argue that "the modem tendency is to apply issue preclusion to issues of law as well as fact."
Id. at 572. The Restatement Second, however, adopts the position that courts should not apply
issue preclusion to issues of law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) Appendix
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
Second, the Restatement Second states that courts should consider allowing relitigation of
an issue when the "determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with another
determination of the same issue." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(4) Appen-
dix (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). The Sixth Circuit's determination in Memphis Development was
inconsistent with the preliminary injunction decision rendered previously by another panel of
that circuit. See Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D.
Tenn. 1977), a fd, 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978). It was also inconsistent with other courts'
determinations. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
Third, Factors was the defendant in Afemphis Develoment and therefore did not choose
the forum. Choice of forum may be significant if "[t]he forum in the second action affords the
party against whom preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities. . . that were not avail-
able in the first action and could likely result in the issue being differently determined." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(2) Appendix (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
Thus, because application of issue preclusion is discretionary with the court, Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979), and because the issue in Factors II involved a
question of law the initial determination of which was arguably inconsistent with prior deci-
sions, the majority probably would not have applied issue preclusion had it reached the ques-
tion. By sidestepping it and according the Sixth Circuit determination conclusive deference,
however, the Second Circuit reached the same result as it would have by invocation of issue
preclusion.
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on the issue of descendibility of publicity rights and what weight that
court would have.accorded the Sixth Circuit's determination of Tennes-
see law. Consequently, the Second Circuit's decision may promote fo-
rum shopping and thwart, rather than enhance, uniform interpretation
of state law.
In Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines,60 the Supreme Court directed fed-
eral courts exercising diversity jurisdiction to ascertain how the highest
court of the forum state would weigh contrary decisions interpreting an-
other state's law.6 1 Without considering how the New York Court of
Appeals would have weighed the Sixth Circuit's prediction of Tennessee.
law, -the Second Circuit independently accorded that prediction disposi-
tive weight. The Second Circuit's failure to consider the position of
New York's highest court ignores Nolan and Erie's policy objectives.
Erie's two primary concerns were the prevention of forum shopping
and the uniform administration of justice in state and federal courts
within the same state.62 Although the Second Circuit's decision pur-
ports to comport with Erie, in fact it may generate forum shopping.
New York state courts asked to determine whether the right of publicity
is descendible under Tennessee law could take one of two approaches:
defer, as did the Second Circuit, to the Sixth Circuit's ruling, or treat
the Sixth Circuit's determination as persuasive authority and indepen-
dently examine the merits. Because New York courts have never before
given conclusive deference to federal court determinations of common
law,63 the latter alternative is more realistic. Therefore, the Second Cir-
cuit's failure to examine the descendibility of publicity question denied
Factors an independent judicial investigation of the merits-an investi-
gation that a state court would have undertaken.64 Consequently, the
60 365 U.S. 293 (1961) (per curiam).
61 Id. at 295-96; see notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra.
62 See notes 8-18 and accompanying text supra.
63 See, e.g., New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 275 N.Y. 258, 9 N.E.2d
858 (1937), afd, 303 U.S. 573 (1938) (Fourth Circuit determination that New York City tax
is constitutional is entitled to great weight, but does not bind New York Court of Appeals);
Howard v. Finnegans Warehouse Corp., 33 A.D.2d 1090, 1090-91, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1022, 1023
(1969) (state court adjudicating a matter of common law is not bound by ruling of federal
court in different circuit).
64 The Second Circuit's refusal to examine the merits is significant in view of Judge
Newman's statement that, had an investigation been conducted, he would "probably uphold
a descendible right of publicity." Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282 (2d
Cir. 1981). The textual analysis assumes that the majority and dissenting opinions were cor-
rect in their determinations that New York state courts using New York conflict of laws rules
would apply Tennessee law. Id. at 281, 284.
Alternatively, New York courts might compare the consequences of applying Tennessee
law with those of applying New York law before deciding which state law to apply. If the
New York courts found that Tennessee law produced an unjust result, the New York state
court would apply New York law. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E. 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Leflar, Choice-Znfiuencing Considerations in Conflicts of Laws, 41 N.Y.U. L.
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Second Circuit's decision may encourage forum shopping between state
and federal courts-precisely what Edie sought to prevent.65
The Second Circuit wrongly emphasized inter-circuit uniformity at
the expense of intra-circuit uniformity. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized explicitly that administering the law uniformly in state and fed-
eral courts within the same state may well generate conflicting federal
court decisions.6 6 Nevertheless, such conflict is an inevitable conse-
quence of the federal court system. 67 Thus, the Second Circuit's pri-
mary concern should have been the uniform administration of the
forum state's law, rather than the promotion of uniformity among the
federal courts. 68
The Second Circuit's professed commitment to the orderly develop-
ment of Tennessee law69 is, as the dissent observed, "speculative at
best."'70 The court argued that its decision to defer to the Sixth Circuit's
determination of Tennessee law would alert the Tennessee legislature
that the Sixth Circuit's determination controlled.71 If that determina-
tion was inaccurate or undesirable, legislators could act to clarify state
law. 72 As the dissent recognized, however, inconsistent federal decisions
are more likely to motivate state legislatures than are consistent
decisions. 73
The Second Circuit further reasoned that if it held the right of pub-
licity descendible under Tennessee law, in contrast to the Sixth Circuit's
ruling, citizens affected by Tennessee law would be unable to discern its
content.74 Although predictability of law is a laudable decisional goal,
it fails as a persuasive justification for the Second Circuit's decision be-
cause that court is powerless to effectuate that goal. Regardless of their
interpretations of state law, the Second and Sixth Circuits cannot bind
REv. 267, 296 (1966). New York courts would not apply New York law automatically if they
found that result superior, but they probably would not conclusively defer to the Sixth Cir-
cuit before considering the merits.
65 After the Second Circuit's decision, a litigant seeking to profit from exploiting Pres-
ley's name or image will not institute an action in federal court in New York, but instead will
litigate in the New York state courts. If the New York state courts ultimately conclude that
the right of publicity is descendible, noncitizens could choose between two coexistent legal
systems. The two systems, however, could not coexist for long. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941), requires federal courts to apply the most recent decisions of
state courts.
66 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
67 Id.
68 See text accompanying note 11 supra. In fact, the court's decision fails even to assure
uniformity among the federal courts. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
69 See note 52 and accompanying text supa.
70 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 286 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting); see id. at 282; notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
71 652 F.2d at 282; see id. at 286.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 282-83.
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courts in any other jurisdiction. 75 Citizens subject to Tennessee law can
now predict how the Second and Sixth Circuits will rule on the right of
publicity issue, but they cannot predict either how courts in other juris-
dictions will rule, or how the Tennessee courts or legislature will act.76
Finally, the Second Circuit's decision might rest on the Sixth Cir-
cuit's presumed familiarity 77 with Tennessee law. The Supreme Court
has given special weight to authoritative federal interpretations of state
law in similar situations.78 The Court, however, has heretofore required
both an initial determination by a federal judge from the state whose
law is in question and an affirmation by the court of appeals of that
circuit before according a federal court interpretation such weight. 79 In
Memphis Development, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's initial
determination and disclaimed any basis for predicting how Tennessee
courts would resolve the issue.80 Thus, neither Erie's policies nor the
Second Circuit's justifications properly support the result in Factors II.
CONCLUSION
Through its attempt to promote predictability and the orderly de-
velopment of Tennessee law, the Second Circuit in Factors II misapplied
Erie and ignored the Supreme Court's directive in Nolan. Erie sought to
promote intra-circuit state and federal uniformity and to discourage fo-
rum shopping between state and federal forums; Nolan directed federal
courts to apply the forum state's prediction of another state's law. By
giving the Sixth Circuit's decision conclusive deference, the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Factors II promotes inter-circuit uniformity at the ex-
pense of intra-circuit uniformity. In addition, it denies the plaintiff the
opportunity to benefit from an independent consideration of the merits
75 See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
76 The Second Circuit maintained that it deferred to the Sixth Circuit as a matter of
stare decisis. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 n.8 (2d Cir. 1981). Previ-
ously, "stare decisis" meant that courts of appeals would be bound only by their earlier deci-
sions and by Supreme Court decisions. Under the "law of the circuit" doctrine, the decision
of a court of appeals only binds courts in that circuit. See note 25 and accompanying text
supra; Note, Securing Unformity in National Law: A Proposalfor National Stare Decisir in the Courtr of
Appeals, 87 YALE LJ. 1219 (1978). The Second Circuit's decision to grant conclusive defer-
ence to a sister court's decision in the name of stare decisis greatly extends traditional stare
decisis doctrine. If adopted by other circuits, the Second Circuit's position could render obso-
lete the "law of the circuit" doctrine.
77 See note 24 and accompanying text srupra.
78 "[O]rdinarily we accept and therefore do not review, save in exceptional cases, the
considered determination of questions of state law by the intermediate federal appellate
courts.. . ..." Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944); accord, Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 346 (1976); Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); United States v.
Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 527 (1959); see MacGregor v. State Mut. Co., 315 U.S.
280 (1942).
79 Id.
80 Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980).
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of the Tennessee law question, an opportunity it would have enjoyed in
state court.
D. Neil Radq
